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Derivative Claims and Ratification:  
Time to Ditch Some Baggage* 
 
ABSTRACT 
The reform of the common law ‘derivative action’, by the statutory ‘derivative claim’ in Part 11 
of the Companies Act 2006, was long overdue.  Many of the common law’s most intractable 
problems, however, lay not with the derivative action itself, but rather with the law governing the 
ratification of breaches of duty.  The source of many of these problems lay in the distinction the 
law sought to draw between fraudulent and non-fraudulent breaches, and the different 
consequences attached to each category of wrongdoing.  The Companies Act 2006 was a timely 
opportunity at least to resolve the confusion within the law, and ideally to adopt what has been 
termed a ‘voting based’ approach to ratification.  Sadly, the Act did neither, preferring instead 
to retain the common law largely untouched.  Moreover, as a careful analysis of the Act itself 
shows, the modest changes it did introduce necessarily preserve the common law’s distinction 
between fraud and non-fraud, and the uncertainty to which this gives rise.  The article concludes 
with an examination of Franbar Holdings v Patel, which illustrates clearly the shortcomings in 
the law’s limited reforms.   
 
I: INTRODUCTION 
The common law derivative action had few friends.1  The Law Commission, in its Report on 
shareholder remedies, spoke of a set of rules that lacked clarity, was unduly complex, and 
                                                          
*  Christopher A Riley, Durham Law School, Durham University.  I am grateful for the helpful comments of the 
anonymous referees.  
1 For critical overviews, see for example A Reisberg, Derivative Actions and Corporate Governance (Oxford: 
OUP 2007); A.J.Boyle, Minority Shareholders' Remedies (Cambridge: Camb.U.Press, 2002) Chs.1&2; J.Poole 
and P.Roberts, ‘Shareholder Remedies – Corporate Wrongs and the Derivative Action’ [1999] J.Bus.L. 99.    
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suffered from inaccessibility, being found only in case law stretching back over very many 
years.2  The solution to these fundamental defects was to be the wholesale replacement of the 
common law action by a new statutory ‘derivative claim’,3 with the relevant rules displayed 
clearly within the statute rather than buried in the case law.4   
 Yet the project of reforming the derivative action was always a limited one.5  Both the 
Law Commission, and ultimately the Companies Act 2006 (hereafter ‘the Act’) which 
introduced the statutory derivative claim,6 left almost wholly untouched the rules on the 
ratification of directors’ breaches of duty, notwithstanding that much of the  uncertainty and 
inaccessibility surrounding derivative claims arose precisely from those rules.  To be sure, the 
desire of law reformers to keep their projects within manageable limits is understandable.  
However, as the Law Commission itself conceded,7 it risks allowing the doubts and defects of 
the old law to creep back into the new, destroying the certainty and accessibility that was the 
very purpose of reform, like failing to remove all the infectious material from a wound.   
Many of the common law’s problems stem from its devotion to what has been called a 
‘transaction based’ approach to ratification, in which much (though it has never been clear how 
much) depended upon the character of the original wrongdoing, and in particular whether it 
                                                          
2  See Law Commission, Shareholders’ Remedies (Law Commission Report No 246, Cm 3769, Stationery 
Office, 1997) para. 6.4 
3 Ibid, Part 6. 
4 On the ‘accessibility agenda’ within the Act, see D Ahern, ‘Directors' duties, dry ink and the accessibility 
agenda’ (2012) Law Quarterly Review 114.   
5 On the reform of the common law action in general, see A.Reisberg, ‘Derivative Claims Under the Companies 
Act 2006: Much Ado About Nothing?’ in J.Armour and J.Payne (eds) Rationality in Company Law: Essays in 
Honour of D D Prentice (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2009). 
6 See Part 11, Companies Act 2006. For good overviews of the new derivative claim, see A.Keay and 
J.Loughrey, ‘Something old, something new, something borrowed: an analysis of the new derivative action 
under the Companies Act 2006’ [2008] LQR 469; A.Keay and J.Loughrey, 'Derivative proceedings in a brave 
new world for company management and shareholders' [2010] J.of Bus.Law 151 
7 See A.Reisberg, ‘Shadows of the Past and Back to the Future: Part 11 of the UK Companies Act 2006 
(in)action (2009) 6 ECFR;   
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amounted to a ‘fraudulent’ wrong.  The Act offered a missed opportunity to abandon this 
approach, and to switch the law’s focus instead to the process of ratification.  All breaches of 
duty, it will be argued, should be capable of being ratified, but all ratifications should require the 
same rigorous process – in terms of the independence, the disinterestedness and the knowledge 
of those permitted to take part in the decision to ratify.  The normative arguments in favour of 
this so-called ‘voting based’ approach are compelling.  It promises both greater certainty 
(avoiding the nebulous distinctions between different categories of wrongdoing drawn by the 
transaction based approach) and greater fairness (by precluding wrongdoers from sanctioning 
their own misbehaviour, whilst preserving the operation of majority rule amongst non-
wrongdoers).     
 The structure of the article is as follows.  Part II describes the common law position on 
ratification and ratifiability, identifying the obscurity surrounding the definition of fraudulent 
misconduct and the uncertainty regarding the consequences for a wrong being categorised as 
such.  Part III considers the defects in the law’s regulation of first non-fraudulent, and then 
fraudulent, wrongs, and the comparative merits of the voting based approach.  Part IV turns to 
the Act.  It concedes that it introduced some welcome improvements in the law governing 
derivative claims, not least in its abandonment of the concept of ‘fraudulent wrongs’ as the 
precondition for bringing derivative proceedings.  But, as Part IV shows, the Act immediately 
reintroduces this concept, with all its associated uncertainty and unfairness, through its retention 
of the common law rules on ratification and the transaction based approach which those rules 
entail.  Nor, it will be argued, can these problems be solved by adopting what has been termed a 
‘heretical’ interpretation of the common law.  For such a strategy flounders on an apparently 
quite minor technical amendment Parliament introduced, during the passage of the Act, to an 
otherwise laudable change to the voting process for ratifying breaches of duty.  The problem is 
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starkly illustrated by the case of Franbar Holdings Ltd v Patel,8 to which Part V turns.  Part VI 
concludes.   
 
 
II  RATIFICATION AT COMMON LAW 
We should begin by distinguishing two different senses in which ‘ratification’ might be used in 
the corporate context.9   One – ‘internal’ – sense entails the purported release of a director’s 
liability to the company for her breach of duty.  The other – ‘external’ – sense concerns the 
validation of transactions entered into by the company with a third party.  A director’s 
misconduct, such as exceeding her authority when negotiating a contract with a third party, 
might threaten the validity of that contract.  But the company might choose to ratify the 
transaction, meaning to validate it, and thus ensure that the contract is enforceable.  This article 
is concerned only with the first sense of ratification – as release.  Note also that ratification, as 
‘release’, is closely related to, but needs to be distinguished from, ‘authorisation’.  The 
distinction is based on timing.  Ratification refers to a release given once a breach has already 
occurred; authorisation entails shareholders approving a director’s future conduct, to prevent a 
breach occurring in the first place.10  (Although authorisation is certainly relevant to our 
discussion, we shall refer only to ratification in this Part, assuming that the rules described as 
applying to ratification apply also to authorisation.)   
At common law, effective ratification was fatal to a derivative action, but it is again 
worthwhile distinguishing two reasons why it might be so.  First, if ratification releases a director 
                                                          
8 [2008] BCC 885. 
9 See J.Payne, ‘A Re-Examination of Ratification’ (1999) 58 Camb L J 604, p.605; R.Cranston, ‘Limiting 
directors’ liability: ratification, exemption and indemnification’ (1992) J of Bus Law 197, p.199.  
10  See P.L.Davies and S.Worthington, Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law (London: Sweet 
and Maxwell, 9th Ed 2012) p.620. 
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from her breach of duty, then there ceases to be any wrong for which the company itself could 
sue, and therefore any wrong for which any shareholder could sue derivatively on the company’s 
behalf.11  Indeed, if the company is bound, ratification will effectively be irrevocable, preventing 
the board, the members,12 or a subsequently appointed liquidator, from deciding the company 
should sue.  In fact, it has been questioned whether ratification alone does indeed bind the 
company, or whether the director must also supply some consideration13 to the company for such 
a release to be binding.14  The more widely held view seems to be that ratification alone 
suffices.15  However, whether or not the company is itself bound, there is a second reason why 
ratification was fatal to derivative proceedings, a reason based on the principle of majority rule.  
If the majority voted to ratify, then minority shareholders at least were bound by that decision, 
and could not then attempt to sue derivatively.16   
 Not all wrongs, however, were ratifiable.  In Edwards v Halliwell,17 in what has become 
the classic modern statement on the point, Jenkins LJ noted four categories of misconduct18 
                                                          
11 A shareholder’s right to sue derivatively, on the company’s behalf, can be no greater than the company’s right 
to sue for itself: Burland v Earle  [1902] AC 83, p.93.  
12 Both current, and future, members would be so prevented. 
13 Or point to a release given under seal by the company.  
14 See R.J.C.Partridge, ‘Ratification and the Release of Directors from Personal Liability’ (1987) 46 Camb LJ 
122. 
15 See eg R.Cranston, op cit n9 pp.199-200; P.L.Davies and S.Worthington, op cit n10, pp.619-620; 
S.Worthington, ‘Corporate governance: remedying and ratifying directors’ breaches’ (2000) LQR 638, pp.642-3; 
Law Commission op cit n2, para 6.84.  
16 Indeed, at common law the mere ratifiability of the misconduct (regardless of whether it had in fact been 
ratified) was seen as justifying the denial of a derivative suit, for there was no point in permitting an action by 
an individual shareholder when the majority could, and presumably would, decide whether to sue or to ratify. 
17 [1950] 2 All ER 1064.  For a more detailed discussion of these four categories of unratifiable wrong, see (the 
2-part article by) K.W.Wedderburn, ‘Shareholders’ Rights and the Rule in Foss v. Harbottle’ (1957) Camb L J 
194 and (1958) Camb L J 93.   
18 These were ultra vires and illegal acts, acts requiring the sanction of a special majority, acts infringing the 
personal rights of shareholders, and acts which constitute a fraud on the minority.  The suggestion of a fifth 
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which were beyond the power of a bare majority to condone.  Only the fourth category – 
breaches of duty amounting to ‘fraud on the minority’ – concerns us here.  Such breaches were 
incapable of ratification by a simple majority.  Notwithstanding any purported ratification, a 
member would remain free to bring a derivative action on the company’s behalf in respect of 
such a breach (provided that she could also establish that the wrongdoers were in control of the 
company and preventing it from suing).19  Yet beyond this trite observation, almost everything 
else about this category of ‘fraud on the minority’ was fraught with confusion.   
 
Fraud: its meaning and consequences 
Much of the uncertainty flowed from the fact that the common law adopted what has been called 
a ‘transaction based approach’.20  It did so in the following sense.  The validity of any ratification 
of a breach of duty depended upon whether that breach was to be categorised as ‘fraud’, and that, 
in turn, depended upon its inherent character.21  Yet the ‘inherent character’ that resulted in a 
breach being categorised as fraud, as well as the precise consequences, so far as ratification was 
concerned, that flowed from a breach being so categorised, remained opaque.   
As to the latter point, whilst it was reasonably clear that breaches of duty that were 
categorised as non-fraudulent were ratifiable, and indeed that the wrongdoing director was 
entitled herself to vote as a shareholder in favour of their ratification,22 considerable doubt 
                                                          
ground, namely ‘wherever the justice of the case so requires’ was rejected by the Court of Appeal in Prudential 
Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd (No 2) [1982] 1Ch 204. 
19 Burland v Earle op cit n11.   
20 See H.C.Hirt, 'Ratification of breaches of directors' duties: the implications of the reform proposal regarding 
the availability of derivative actions' (2004) The Company Lawyer 197; A.Keay and J.Loughrey, 'Derivative 
proceedings in a brave new world for company management and shareholders' [2010] J.of Bus.Law 151, pp.162-
5; J.Payne, op cit n9, pp.611-3.   
21  See K.W.Wedderburn, op cit n17.     
22  This applied the general principle that members of a company were permitted to vote, as shareholders, on 
matters in which they were interested; see eg North-West Transportation v Beatty (1887) 12 App.Cas.589.  
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surrounded the status of breaches that did amount to fraud.  The orthodox view was that fraud 
was simply unratifiable, and that remained the case whatever the process by which any purported 
ratification took place.23  This reinforced the point that fraud was simply a matter of the 
character of the wrongdoing, and had nothing to do with the process of ratification.  As 
Wedderburn put it, ‘[f]raud lies rather in the nature of the transaction than in the motives of the 
majority’.24  The alternative – but heretical – position was that even wrongs that constituted fraud 
could be ratified but, in contrast to non-fraudulent wrongs, the process of ratification was 
required to be more rigorous and, in particular, had to be effected in some sense ‘independently’ 
of the wrongdoers.  We return to this below. 
 For now, we turn to the law’s failure to identify clearly what characteristics made a 
wrong sufficiently egregious to constitute ‘fraud’ in the first place.  This failure has been well 
rehearsed elsewhere, and need not be explored in detail here.25  As one writer put it, the 
category of fraud ‘comprises a ragbag of miscellaneous fiddlings which seem to defy all 
attempts to form them into recognisable juridical classes.’26  Misappropriating corporate 
property was seen as the clearest example of fraud,27 but to cast the net of liability more 
widely ‘property’ came to be given an extended, and consequently more nebulous, meaning.  
In Burland v Earle, for example, property was said to include ‘money, property or 
                                                          
23  Unless, perhaps, by a unanimous vote of all shareholders; see eg B.Hannigan, ‘Limitations on a shareholder’s 
right to vote – effective ratification revisited’ (2000) J Bus Law 493, pp.495-9. 
24  K.W.Wedderburn, ‘Shareholders’ Rights and the Rule in Foss v. Harbottle’ (Part 2) (1958) Camb L J 93, 
p96.  It was in this sense that Lord Wedderburn thought the fourth exception to Foss ought to be called ‘fraud on 
the company’ than ‘fraud on the minority’. 
25 See eg C.R.Baxter, ‘The True Spirit of Foss v Harbottle’ [1987] 38 NILQ 6; P.L.Davies and S.Worthington, 
op cit n10, pp.624-6; K.W.Wedderburn op cit n17; G.R.Sullivan, ‘Restating the Scope of the Derivative Action’ 
[1985] 44 Camb L.J. 236, pp239-244, A.Reisberg, ‘Theoretical Reflections on Derivative Actions in English 
Law: The Representative Problem’ (2006) 3 ECFR 69, pp77-78; R.Baxt, ‘Judges in their Own Cause: The 
Ratification of Directors’ Breaches of Duty’ [1978] 5 Monash U.L.Rev.16;  
26 C.R.Baxter, ibid, p14. 
27  See Burland v Earle op cit n11, p.93. 
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advantages which belong to the company or in which the other shareholders are entitled to 
participate.’28  And in Cook v Deeks, it was extended to property ‘which belongs in equity to 
the company’, namely a mere corporate opportunity grabbed by the directors personally.29   
However, basing fraud upon this capacious conceptualisation of corporate property 
proved hugely difficult to reconcile with the House of Lords’ decision in Regal (Hastings) 
Ltd v Gulliver.30  The directors of Regal exploited for their own benefit an opportunity 
originally available to their company.31  Nevertheless, the court indicated that ratification 
would have been possible meaning, according to the orthodox understanding, that their 
misconduct did not amount to fraud.32  To be sure, there may have been differences in the 
character of the wrongdoing in Regal, compared to that in, say, Cook, such as whether the 
directors’ were acting in good faith,33 or whether the company was ultimately harmed or 
helped by the directors’ behaviour.34  Yet those differences do not seem to turn on whether 
property, in its extended sense, was taken, but instead simply bring in additional factors to 
excuse this misappropriation of a broadly-conceived ‘property’.   
The transaction based approach also struggled in its treatment of negligence.  Negligence 
would not appear to constitute a misappropriation of property, and indeed was held to be 
ratifiable in Pavlides v Jensen.35  Yet in Daniels v Daniels,36 the court extended fraud to capture 
                                                          
28 Ibid.   
29 [1916] 1 AC 554, pp.563-4.  For difficulties in construing Cook v Deeks as involving a taking of corporate 
property, see Sullivan op cit n25, 241. 
30 [1967] 2 AC 134. 
31 Ibid, p.143. 
32  In fact, the directors failed to take the precaution of having their conduct ratified, notwithstanding the 
impending sale of the company to a third party, who subsequently caused the company to sue the (by now 
former) directors.   
33 See K.W.Wedderburn, ‘Derivative actions and Foss v Harbottle’ [1981] 44 MLR 201, 206. 
34 See eg B.Hannigan, op cit n23, p.506.   
35 [1956] Ch 565. 
36 [1978] Ch 406. 
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what has been termed ‘self-serving’ negligence, with Templeman J declaring that fraud exists 
where directors ‘use their powers, intentionally or unintentionally, fraudulently or negligently, in 
a manner which benefits themselves at the expense of the company.’  Once again, the difficulty 
was reconciling this even-broader conceptualisation of fraud with Regal, in which the directors 
clearly did benefit themselves.  A possible reconciliation is available through Templeman J’s 
rider that the self-benefit must be ‘at the expense of the company’.  If it really would not be in a 
company’s best interests to exploit an opportunity which a director then takes for herself, 
arguably the company loses nothing as a result.  Yet this requires a judicial business judgement 
whether it would have been in the company’s own interests to exploit the commercial 
opportunity for itself, something courts have steadfastly refused to do.37      
If the meaning of fraud was shrouded in uncertainty, so too were its consequences.  As 
noted, the orthodox understanding held that fraudulent wrongs were simply unratifiable.  The 
alternative, heretical, view was that such wrongs were not inherently incapable of being 
ratified.  Rather, their fraudulent character merely prevented the wrongdoers from procuring 
their release.  The most familiar recent judicial expression of this view was by Vinelott J at 
first instance in Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd (No 2).38  Starting 
with the definition of fraud itself, Vinelott J interpreted earlier case law as holding fraud to 
exist whenever the wrongdoer obtained a personal benefit.39  This was clearly similar to the 
definition adopted by Templeman J in Daniels, although with no requirement that the benefit 
                                                          
37  In Regal itself, op cit n30, Lord Russell of Killowen, emphasised that liability applied irrespective of 
‘whether the plaintiff [company] has in fact been damaged or benefited by his action’ (p144) and Lord Wright 
(p154) noted the court’s inability to determine whether the company was commercially able to exploit for itself 
the opportunity taken by the director.         
38 [1981] 1Ch 257. 
39 Ibid, 316 
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be made ‘at the expense of the company’.40  However, Regal then presented an even greater 
challenge to this approach, for on this definition the directors were indisputably guilty of 
fraud, and the possible absence of any harm to the company could not now be invoked to 
avoid this conclusion.  But Vinelott J turned this difficulty to his advantage, arguing that 
Regal demonstrated that even fraudulent wrongdoing was capable of ratification, provided 
that the wrongdoers ‘did not control the company’ and that the majority ‘does not have an 
interest which conflicts with that of the company’.41  It was in this sense, Vinelott J argued, 
that the House of Lords in Regal had suggested the directors could have had their misconduct 
ratified.     
It is worth pausing here to stress that Vinelott J continued to adopt a transaction based 
approach, in the sense described above.42  Fraudulent and non-fraudulent breaches were still 
to be distinguished, and treated differently.  Only the former required a disinterested vote to 
be ratified; non-fraudulent wrongdoing,43 Vinelott J felt bound to accept on the basis of past 
precedent,44 could still be ratified with the votes of wrongdoers.   
The additional uncertainty generated by this heretical, and competing, account of the 
law might be avoided if one could easily dismiss Vinelott J’s efforts as an obvious 
misreading of the doctrine.  Yet whilst some have certainly sought to do so, other 
commentators have countered that the heresy enjoys rather more, and the orthodoxy rather 
less, precedential support than is too often assumed.45  So, whilst Wedderburn described 
                                                          
40 Ibid, 316 D.  As Vinelott J himself conceded (316F), a test of ‘personal benefit’ created a penumbra of 
uncertainty where the benefit was received not by the director personally but, say, by a member of his family.   
41 [1981] 1 Ch 257, 307. 
42 See supra  n20 and the text therewith. 
43 Of course, Vinelott J’s broadened definition of fraud, requiring only personal benefit by the wrongdoer, would 
correspondingly reduce the instances of non-fraudulent breaches of duty.   
44 [1981] 1 Ch 257, pp316-7.   
45  See eg Baxter op cit n25 and Sullivan op cit n25. 
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Vinelott J’s re-reading of Regal as ‘ingenious but astonishing’,46 Sullivan noted that 
comments in Regal about the possibility of ratification were clearly obiter, and that 
accordingly ‘Regal has nothing to say on the prerequisites of valid ratification. It neither 
confirms nor denies the Vinelott analysis’.47  Similarly, although Vinelott J’s judgement was 
badly mauled by the Court of Appeal,48  the Court’s comments regarding the preconditions 
for a derivative action were, strictly, obiter.49   
Adding to the uncertainty is the fact that in many of the cases where the courts refused 
to respect a purported ratification, such as Cook v Deeks,50 or Atwool v Merryweather,51 the 
wrongdoers typically did have control of the company and used it to ratify their own 
wrongdoing.  It is, then, unclear whether the ratification was ineffective because of the 
category of the wrongdoing (as the orthodoxy argues), or because of the self-serving use of 
the wrongdoers’ votes (as the heretical interpretation claims).52  As Baxter put it, bluntly, 
‘[w]here was it held, that is to say, necessarily held as a matter of black letter ratio decidendi, 
                                                          
46  Wedderburn, op cit n33, pp.210-211. Wedderburn pointed out that the House of Lords said nothing to 
suggest the directors would not have been permitted to vote on the ratification, and doubted they intended this 
but simply forgot to mention it.  
47  Sullivan, op cit n25, p.248. 
48 [1982] 1 Ch 204. For discussion of the Court of Appeal’s decision, see Baxter op cit n25, Wedderburn op cit 
n33, Sullivan op cit n25,  A.J.Boyle, ‘The Private Law Enforcement of Directors’ Duties’ in K.J.Hopt and 
G.Teubner (Eds) Corporate Governance and Directors’ Liabilities (Berlin, W.de Gruyter, 1985); M.Speakman, 
‘Directors’ Duties and the Rule in Foss v Harbottle’ (1983-5) 10 Sydney L.Rev. 156; L.Sealy, ‘Foss v Harbottle 
– A Marathon Where Nobody Wins’ [1981] Camb.L.J. 29. 
49  By the time of the Court of Appeal hearing, the company’s board had decided to adopt the proceedings, thus 
rendering unnecessary the derivative proceedings.   
50 op cit n29. 
51 (1867-68) L.R. 5 Eq. 464 
52  See, for example, the ambiguity inherent in Jessel MR’s explanation of Atwool v Merryweather (in Russell v 
Wakefield Waterworks Co (1875) LR 20 eq 474 at 482), where he notes, ‘[i]t was said that justice required that 
the majority of the corporators should not appropriate to themselves the property of the minority, and then use 
their own votes at the general meeting of the corporation to prevent their being sued by the corporation’.   
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that if a fraud is practised on a company by its controllers all its shareholders are thereupon 
barred from exercising any judgement on the matter?’53   
Since the cases do not show unequivocally that it is the character of the wrongdoing 
that precludes ratification, those defending the orthodoxy have tended to fall back on more 
indirect doctrinal points in support.  But these hardly provide knock-down arguments either.54  
Wedderburn, for example, argued that permitting ratification by independent shareholders 
would require the court to do ‘what a century ago James L.J. [in Mason v. Harris (1879) 11 
Ch.D. 97, 109] concluded English courts could not do: submit the issue to a meeting at which 
only independent or "disinterested" shareholders may vote’.55  Yet even if the court cannot 
order such a meeting to be held, this hardly settles the effect of a ratification passed at a 
meeting which the company has chosen to hold.  Moreover, the Court of Appeal itself in 
Prudential, when considering how a judge was to determine whether a derivative action 
should be allowed to proceed, accepted it might be appropriate for the judge  ‘to grant a 
sufficient adjournment to enable a meeting of shareholders to be convened by the board, so 
that he can reach a conclusion in the light of the conduct of, and proceedings at, that 
meeting’.56  Finally, in Smith v Croft (No 3),57 the court held that an independent organ of the 
company (such as a meeting of shareholders all of whom were independent of the 
wrongdoer)58 might decide that the company should not sue, and such a decision would be 
                                                          
53  Baxter, op cit n25, p15. 
54 In this Part, we are considering only the doctrinal support for the orthodox, and heretical, versions of the 
transaction based approach.  Part II addresses the policy arguments in their support.   
55 R J Wedderburn, op cit n33, p.208, fn. omitted. 
56 Op cit n18 at 222A.   
57 (1987) 3 BCC 218. 
58 It has been argued that a sufficiently independent board of directors might also constitute such an organ; see 
D.D.Prenctice, ‘Shareholder Actions: the Rule in Foss v Harbottle’ (1988) 104 LQR 341, pp.345-6.   
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binding upon a minority shareholder, even if the wrong was unratifiable.59  Although a 
decision not to sue would not, technically, constitute a ratification, and thus would not be 
binding on the company itself,60 it suggests nevertheless a procedural flexibility at odds with 
the court’s view in Mason v Harris.61   
Wedderburn also claimed that permitting wrongs categorised as fraud to be ratified, 
provided this were effected without the votes of the wrongdoers, conflicted with past 
decisions holding that shareholders were entitled to vote on a matter notwithstanding they 
had a personal interest in it.62  This might indeed have been a compelling argument against 
any judicial63 attempt to prevent interested members from voting in respect of non-fraudulent 
wrongs.   However, as we have seen, Vinelott J accepted that some wrongs would remain 
categorised as non-fraudulent, and that wrongdoers would remain entitled to vote to ratify 
them.  He sought to ignore the votes of wrongdoers only in respect of misconduct categorised 
as fraud.  Yet in respect of such wrongs, the orthodoxy viewed all shareholders as having no 
right to vote in favour of ratification.64  And as noted, in Smith v Croft (No3), it was accepted 
that the votes of wrongdoers might be ignored (albeit this was held in respect of a decision 
not to sue rather than to ratify).65   
                                                          
59 The decision in Smith v Croft (No3) applied Vinelott J’s earlier judgement in Taylor v. National Union of 
Mineworkers (Derbyshire Area) [1985] BCLC 237.   
60 The case does assume that ratification is binding on the company although, as we noted above (supra n14 and the 
text therewith this is not entirely certain).       
61 See text with n55 supra. 
62  See supra n33. 
63 But not, to be sure, of any legislative reform of the law, as occurred by Companies Act 2006 s239(3)-(4); see 
infra Part IV.   
64  See Baxter, op cit n 25, p.16. 
65  Or, to put the point more strictly, the validity of a decision not to sue would depend upon whether 
wrongdoers had voted.   
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 Let us recap.  The common law governing ratification exhibited all the complexity, 
inaccessibility and lack of clarity which the Law Commission so forcefully condemned.  The 
whole edifice of the transaction based approach was built around a distinction between 
fraudulent and non-fraudulent wrongs, yet it was fundamentally uncertain which breaches of 
duty fell into either category.  The distinctions between them turned on nebulous concepts, such 
as the misappropriation of property, or else on factors which were likely to prove difficult to 
apply in practice (such as whether the wrongdoer had received a personal benefit) or which the 
law had wisely chosen sometimes to exclude in its formulation of the substantive content of 
some directors’ duties (such as whether the company had been harmed by the director’s 
wrongdoing).66  Nor could one say with certainty what were the consequences of a wrong being 
categorised as fraud. Fundamental disagreement existed between the orthodox and heretical 
interpretations of the transaction based approach, and neither position could be easily dismissed 
as simply not fitting with relevant case law.   
   
III: THE BAD CONSEQUENCES OF A CONFUSED DISTINCTION  
The preceding Part focused on the law’s lack of clarity and certainty.  These are undoubtedly 
significant defects.  Yet the problems run deeper still.  This Part, accordingly, turns to examine 
the underlying policy considerations which render the common law treatment of ratification so 
unsatisfactory.  As we have seen, the common law’s transaction based approach attempts to 
distinguish between fraudulent and non-fraudulent breaches of duty in order to fashion different 
treatments for each category of wrong.  Yet, it will be argued, neither such treatment can be 
justified.   
 
                                                          
66 See for example the imposition of liability under the no-profit rule. 
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(a) The treatment of non-fraudulent wrongs 
 The first criticism concerns the law’s lax treatment of wrongs categorised as non-
fraudulent.  There were two aspects to this.  First, mere ratifiability, rather than actual 
ratification, was sufficient to prevent any derivative action in respect of such a wrong.67  The law 
could safely assume that members would be happy to ratify the wrong (even if they had not 
bothered to do so) for if they were not happy to ratify, they would presumably take steps to have 
the company sue instead.  But such an assumption is quite unrealistic.  There may be many 
reasons why a majority of members that does not wish to ratify still does not take on the 
significant burden of suing.68  One reason is that companies’ constitutions69 typically no longer 
give a simple majority of shareholders authority to determine that proceedings shall be brought.70  
To be sure, shareholders might be able, by special resolution, to direct the board to commence 
proceedings.71  But this requirement of a special resolution to force the issue destroys the neat 
symmetry behind the assumption that if a bare majority of members does not favour 
ratification,that bare majority could instead cause the company to sue.      
Second, wrongs which did not amount to fraud could be excused by a resolution passed 
with the votes of the wrongdoers themselves.  Yet there was nothing inherent in the nature of 
non-fraudulent wrongs to warrant such self-interested release.  As Worthington has noted, 
                                                          
67 See eg Edwards v Halliwell op cit n17, p.1066.  
68 See H.C.Hirt, Ratification of breaches of directors’ duties: the implications of the reform proposal regarding 
the availability of derivative actions’ (2004) The Co Lawyer 197, p.206. 
69 That shareholders’ authority to sue depends upon their company’s constitution, rather than company law, 
seems to be confirmed by Breckland Group Holdings v London and Suffolk Properties [1989] BCLC 100; 
V.Joffe, D.Drake, G.Richardson and D.Lightman, Minority Shareholders: Law, Practice, and Procedure 
(Oxford: OUP, 2008, 3rd Ed) paras 1.05-1.08. 
70 See for example reg.3 of each of the three current versions of Model Articles (for Private Companies Limited 
by Shares, for Private Companies Limited by Guarantee, and for Public Companies) found respectively in 
Schedules 1-3 of The  (Companies (Model Articles) Regulations 2008 SI 2008/3229).   
71  Ibid, reg.4 gives shareholders this power.  
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whatever the character of the underlying wrong to the company, a decision to ratify may involve 
giving up a valuable corporate right.72  Whilst it might be acceptable for a majority of 
shareholders to release a director from liability, that director (and others too close to her) should 
not be permitted to participate in such a decision.  It might be thought this second criticism is so 
widely accepted that there is little point in labouring it.  Indeed, as we shall see, under the 
Companies Act 2006 wrongdoers’ votes must now be ignored on any ratification.73  And yet, this 
statutory restriction is limited, both in terms of those whose votes cannot be counted, and in the 
fact that the restriction applies only to ratifications, and not to prior authorisations at all.74  
Moreover, disenfranchising members from voting has raised disquiet from some commentators,75 
and there are at least two counter-arguments that might be offered against denying wrongdoers 
the right to vote which deserve to be considered further.     
First, ignoring wrongdoers’ votes might be seen as an unjustifiable infringement of 
shareholders’ property rights, as owners of the company.76  It would be easy to dismiss this 
counter-argument by noting that to assume shareholders are indeed ‘owners’ of the company, 
and that their rights can be deduced straightforwardly from that ownership, gets matters the 
wrong way round.  We need first to decide what rights shareholders ought to enjoy, and then 
decide whether those rights would justify us in describing shareholders as ‘owners’.  Yet this still 
leaves open the question of what rights – and, in particular, what voting rights – shareholders 
                                                          
72 S.Worthington op cit n15. 
73 See infra Part IV.   
74 Ibid.   
75 See for example L.S.Sealy, op cit n48 and Baxter, op cit n25. 
76 This is often taken to be the justification for dicta, such as in North-West Transportation v Beatty, op cit n23, 
permitting shareholders to vote notwithstanding a personal interest in the matter; see eg J.E.Parkinson, 
Corporate Power and Responsibility (Oxford: OUP, 1993) 255.  Of course, a shareholder’s right to vote out of 
self-interest is not entirely unlimited.  Most notably, a resolution by members to alter a company’s articles is 
liable to be set aside if not passed ‘bona fide in the best interests of the company as a whole’: see Allen v Gold 
Reefs of West Africa Limited [1900] 1 Ch 656. 
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should have.   One way to determine that is to think what voting rights shareholders would, at the 
outset of their relationship, rationally agree upon.  Would shareholders, unaware of whether they 
will in the future be wrongdoers or non-wrongdoers, prefer a regime under which wrongdoers 
are permitted to vote to excuse their own wrongdoing?   
To apply this ‘contractarian’77 method of identifying shareholders’ rights, it would seem 
plausible to imagine that shareholders participate in the co-operative enterprise that is a 
corporation primarily in order to secure their own self-interest.  But is a member’s self-interest 
better served by permitting, or by precluding, herself and her fellow shareholders from voting 
where personal interests conflict with the commercial interests of the company?  The answer, 
surely, is that it all depends.  On the one hand, if members with such conflicting personal 
interests are prevented from voting, then this is likely to advance the value of the company, and 
in so doing to maximise average shareholder wealth.  This would seem to support 
disenfranchisement.  And yet shareholders, surely, would also foresee, ex ante, that they may 
have some legitimate personal interests they wish to be able to assert even if this lowers the 
company’s value.  Shareholders sometimes – and especially in quasi partnerships – have 
expectations to remain directors, to see a certain dividend policy respected, certain possible lines 
of business foregone, and so on, even if this will decrease the company’s value.  Of course, there 
are many ways in which shareholders may seek to protect such interests,78 of which retaining the 
                                                          
77 Literature discussing and debating the merits of contractarian analysis in company law is too voluminous to 
cite, but a useful introduction remains B.R.Cheffins, Company Law: Theory, Structure and Operation (Oxford: 
OUP 1997). Where, as here, such analysis employs the parties’ ‘hypothetical bargains’ to prescribe the content 
of company law (rather than, say, seeking to describe and explain the current content of company law) it draws 
on a larger literature exploring the design of ‘default rules’ in contract law more generally.  On that, see for 
example D.Charny, ‘Hypothetical Bargains: The Normative Structure of Contract Interpretation’ (1991) 89 
Michigan L.Rev.1815; C.A.Riley, ‘Designing Default Rules in Contract Law: Consent, Conventionalism and 
Efficiency’ (2000) 20 OJLS 367.      
78 Options would include the creation of constitutional rights, class rights, rights conferred by shareholder 
agreements, and so forth.   
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right to vote self-interestedly is probably not the most effective.  The point here is only that 
permitting self-interested voting in respect of such matters may be rational for shareholders to 
agree ex ante.   
Is, however, the right to vote to excuse one’s own breach of duty the sort of interest 
which shareholders would agree each might legitimately assert?  Surely it is not.  It seems 
entirely implausible to think that any member would argue, ex ante, that she has an important 
interest, integral to her membership of the company, in permitting herself to excuse her own 
future breach of duty.  On the contrary, the behaviour expected of a director is itself specified ex 
ante.   The duties to which they are subject can be regarded as a set of rules designed to 
maximise the value of the company,79 and thereby the collective wealth of all members.  To 
allow an individual member to vote, out of self-interest, to excuse her own breach of those 
duties, frustrates this prior planning.80  And, to labour the point, this is so in respect of all those 
duties, whether they involve negligence, personal benefit, misappropriation of property, and so 
on.  Of course, if the purpose of the duties is indeed to maximise the value of the company, then 
whether a breach of duty should, ex post, in a particular case, be released or enforced will depend 
upon whether its enforcement will indeed maximise the value of the company.  But again, this is 
a matter that should be determined solely by calculation of what is in the company’s interests,81 
without being influenced by the illegitimate interests of any particular member.   
                                                          
79 It would require a much longer work to determine whether this condition is currently met in the UK.  But if 
not, it would seem to require an adjustment of the duties of directors, not a rejection of the argument being 
advanced here. 
80 Companies Act 2006, s 232 (provisions protecting directors from liability are void) might be argued to rest on 
the assumption that shareholders would not rationally seek to exclude ex ante the duties imposed on directors. 
81 This is, surely, the approach captured by the ‘hypothetical director’ test which courts must apply, under 
Companies Act 2006, ss 263(2)(a) and 263(3)(b), in deciding whether to grant permission to continue a derivative 
claim.  For factors the courts have identified as relevant to this commercial calculation, see eg Franbar Holdings v 
Patel op cit n8 and Iesini v Westrip Holdings Ltd Ltd [2010] BCC 420. 
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The second counter-argument (against disenfranchising wrongdoers) is based on the 
claim that the company’s commercial interests might in fact be promoted if enforcement action 
against directors for non-fraudulent wrongs – and especially for negligence – were inhibited.  
Actions for negligence may risk requiring judicial business judgements for which judges are ill-
equipped,82 threaten to waste managerial time and effort,83 and may encourage an excessively 
risk-averse attitude by directors who worry whether their reasonable mistakes will be judged too 
harshly by courts enjoying the luxury of hindsight.84  Permitting ratification by wrongdoers 
reduces the likelihood of actions and thereby reduces the foregoing problems.   
In response to this argument, it might be suggested that a better way to reduce the threat 
of liability for negligence is by changing the content of the duty itself, reducing the standard of 
conduct demanded of directors.   Better to demand a lower standard85 that is effectively enforced 
than to impose a higher standard with little prospect of enforcement.86  However, Eisenberg has 
argued that there may in fact be good reasons for maintaining a comparatively high standard of 
conduct, achieved by an onerous legal duty of care and skill, even whilst ensuring that this high 
standard of conduct is not effectively enforced by the courts.87  Eisenberg’s essential point is that 
a demanding duty of care might generate improvements in the behaviour of those on whom the 
                                                          
82 S.M.Bainbridge, The New Corporate Governance in Theory and Practice (Oxford: OUP, 2008) ch.3. 
83 A Reisberg, op cit n1, pp48-50 
84  This is the so-called ‘hindsight bias’ – that the bad consequences of a decision are taken to mean that the 
decision itself was a bad one.    
85 For an argument to that effect, see C.A.Riley, ‘The Director’s Duty of Care and Skill: The Case for an 
Onerous but Subjective Standard’ (1999) MLR 697.  
86 The enforcement (as opposed to the substantive content) of directors’ duties has recently begun to receive 
increased attention; see for example J.Armour, ‘Enforcement Strategies in UK Corporate Governance: A 
Roadmap and Empirical Assessment’; in J Armour and J Payne (eds), Rationality in Company Law (Oxford: 
Hart Publishing 2009). 
87 M.A.Eisenberg, ‘The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and Standards of Review in Corporate Law’ (1993) 
62 Fordham L.Rev. 436. 
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duty is imposed (say through social norms that encourage compliance), notwithstanding that 
legal enforcement of the duty is deliberately made unlikely.   
Nevertheless, even if Eisenberg’s argument is accepted, it is unconvincing to suggest that 
the common law’s lax attitude towards ratification is the appropriate way to inhibit actions for 
negligence.  Eisenberg himself argues that the appropriate safeguard against directors facing 
excessive liability is the courts’ ‘standard of review’– the standard the court applies when it 
decides whether to impose liability for breach of the law’s demanding duty of care.  By setting 
this standard of review relatively low – primarily through the business judgement rule88 – courts 
can retain a demanding duty of care, yet ensure directors are rarely actually held liable for 
breaching it.  In comparison, inhibiting the number of legal actions for negligence by permitting 
self-interested ratification is both too wide and too narrow.  It is too narrow in that it works only 
where a wrongdoer happens to have enough votes to make a difference to the outcome.  It is too 
wide in that where a wrongdoer does happen to have enough votes to save herself, it entirely 
avoids the possibility of an action, denying the court any chance to review the director’s 
behaviour.   
  
(b)  The treatment of ‘fraudulent’ breaches of duty 
As we have seen, at common law there was considerable uncertainty as to the consequences of a 
duty being categorised as fraud.  However, the orthodox view was that such a breach was simply 
incapable of being ratified, even by a disinterested shareholder vote.  But this effectively 
disenfranchised any disinterested shareholder who favoured ratification.  To be sure, the decision 
in Smith v Croft (No 3)89 did at least allow an independent organ to decide the company should 
                                                          
88 See D.Kershaw, Company Law in Context (Oxford: OUP, 2012, 2nd Ed.) 455-475; S.M.Bainbridge, ‘The 
Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine’ [2004] 57 Vanderbilt L Rev 83. 
89 Op cit n57. 
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not sue, and such a decision would be binding on the minority.90  Nevertheless, such a decision 
was revocable; the company remained free to change its mind and launch proceedings against the 
wrongdoer.91  Hannigan has defended  this differential treatment of ratification, and decisions not 
to sue, arguing that the law’s refusal to permit fraud to be irrevocably excused‘is important in 
terms of identifying core standards of corporate behaviour’.92  But whose interests does it 
actually serve for the law to impose an outright ban on companies ratifying some breaches, rather 
than, say, controlling more rigorously the process by which ratifications must be effected? 
 First, perhaps an outright ban on ratifications of some breaches of duty is necessary to 
protect minority shareholders opposed to ratification.  Yet majority rule is a well-established 
feature of our company law, and some further argument is necessary why it should not apply 
when deciding whether to release a director from some breaches of duty.  Such an argument 
might be based on the historically lax voting process that was applied to ratification, which 
clearly provided minorities with little protection against controlling wrongdoers.93  Yet this 
argument has a number of weaknesses.  First, it justifies a tightening up of voting procedures, not 
the entire removal of some matters from the scope of majority rule.  It may be unfair to force 
minorities to submit to a ratification procured with the votes of the wrongdoers, but not to a 
ratification passed independently of their influence.  Moreover, merely removing some breaches 
from the operation of an overly lax process of ratification would hardly cure the defects of that 
overly lax process in respect of non-fraudulent wrongs.  Finally, concern for minority 
                                                          
90 See supra text with n59.   
91 Admittedly, in many companies there would be no real likelihood of the company ‘changing its mind’ so long 
as the existing shareholders remain in control, although things might well be different if the company were to be 
sold.    
92 Hannigan op cit n23, p.504. 
93  As Koh notes, ‘[l]egitimate concerns over the abuse of majority power and the corresponding risk of minority 
shareholder oppression therefore birthed the doctrine of unratifiable wrongs’; see P.Koh, ‘Directors’ Fiduciary 
Duties: Unthreading the Joints of Shareholder Ratification’ [2005] J of Corp. L.Studies 363, p.387. 
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shareholders does not explain or justify the law’s distinction between ratifications and decisions 
not to sue.  If it is unfair to impose on existing minorities a decision to ratify fraudulent wrongs, 
why is it not also unfair to impose upon them a decision not to sue?  Of course, the law’s 
eventual acceptance that decisions not to sue should be binding on minorities was conditional on 
such decisions being taken independently of the wrongdoers.94  But this merely reinforces the 
preceding point: what matters is the rigour of the voting process.    
 Does a concern for the interests of future shareholders, who will suffer when they find 
themselves bound by a decision to ratify that was taken before they became members, justify 
precluding the ratification of some breaches of duty?95  Again, the answer must be no.  A future 
member will take the company as she finds it when she decides to join.  Even if its value were to 
be depressed by directorial misconduct before she became a member, and in respect of which the 
company had irrevocably given up the right to sue, the price this new member will pay for her 
shares will presumably reflect this.96  Future members are much less deserving of sympathy than 
are current minority shareholders who find that their shares fall in value during their 
membership; if the latter are to be bound by such a decision, then future members should be 
too.97  Finally, even if (implausibly) it were felt that future members should be protected against 
prior breaches of duty, this would hardly justify holding only fraudulent breaches of duty to be 
unratifiable, but would instead seem to require future members to be protected against the earlier 
ratification of any breach of duty.  
                                                          
94 See supra text with n59.    
95 See Payne, op cit 9, p.619. 
96 Note however s 260(3) continues to permit members to bring derivative proceedings in respect of corporate 
acts or omissions which occurred prior to the date they became members, promising a windfall where the price 
the members paid for their shares already reflected such past misconduct. 
97 Take, for example, the purchaser in Regal (Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver op cit n30 .  Would any injustice be done 
to such a purchaser if the directors’ wrong had been ratified irrevocably?    
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Does the protection of non-shareholder groups require that some breaches of duty be 
unratifiable?  The purpose of most duties, although owed to ‘the company’,98 is nevertheless to 
protect shareholders’ interests, at least whilst the company remains solvent.99  For such 
shareholder-protecting duties, third parties can have little complaint if shareholders choose to 
forego the protection they confer.  However, different considerations do apply where the 
company succumbs to insolvency.  A seam of case law100 has suggested that, once a company is 
actually insolvent, or on the verge of insolvency, the interests of the company become the 
interests of its creditors.101  Moreover, a liquidator, seeking to swell the assets of the company, 
might also wish to sue in respect of the past breach of other duties.102  This might seem to justify 
precluding the (irrevocable) ratification of some wrongs, even whilst enforcing decisions not to 
sue in respect of them.  Ratification, if effective, would bind a liquidator, whereas a decision not 
to sue would not.   
However, this hardly justifies treating all fraudulent wrongs, but only fraudulent wrongs, 
as inherently non-ratifiable.  First, some breaches of duty that harm creditors – such as a failure 
to have regard to their interests when the company is on the verge of insolvency – might well not 
                                                          
98 See now Companies Act 2006, s 170(1).   
99 This is surely true even of Companies Act 2006, s 172 of the. Whilst this does indeed require directors ‘to 
have regard to’ the interests of a variety of constituencies, the ‘benefit of the members’ is still the ultimate 
purpose behind this other-regarding requirement.   
100 This common law development is explicitly acknowledged by s 172(3).   
101 See P.L.Davies and S.Worthington, op cit n10, paras 16.82-16.90; A.Keay, ‘Directors’ Duties to Creditors: 
Contractarian Concerns Relating to Efﬁciency and Over-Protection of Creditors’ (2003) 66 MLR 665; 
C.A.Riley, ‘Directors’ duties and the interests of creditors’ (1989) 10 The Company Lawyer 87; D.D.Prentice, 
‘Creditor’s Interests and Director’s Duties’ (1990) 10 OJLS 265; V.Finch, ‘Directors’ Duties: Insolvency and 
the Unsecured Creditor’ in A. Clarke (ed), Current Issues in Insolvency Law (London: Stevens, 1991) 87; 
A.Keay, ‘The Duty of Creditors to Take Account of Creditors’ Interests: Has it Any Role to Play?’ [2002] JBL 
379. 
102 See eg Extrasure Travel Insurances Ltd v Scattergood [2002] WL 31599760 (duty to act for proper 
purposes).   
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amount to fraud.   Second, to preclude ratification of any fraudulent wrong would restrict 
shareholders even in cases where no question of creditor protection arose.  
 Finally, do shareholders themselves – and in particular, even an independent and 
disinterested majority voting in favour of ratification – need to be protected against their own 
folly in ratifying.  At first sight, this looks implausible.  Once it is accepted that a majority of 
independent shareholders should be able to bind the minority (by a decision not sue), why should 
they not also be allowed to bind themselves (by a decision to ratify).  But perhaps some case 
might still be made for a paternalistic protection even for ‘independent’ shareholders.  Many 
commentators103 have emphasised the collective action problems,104 and the limited information 
and bounded rationality,105 from which shareholders suffer. Particular emphasis has been placed 
on the extent to which shareholders rely for their information on directors themselves.  If 
directors can manipulate such information, then ratification could easily become a meaningless 
rubber-stamping exercise that wrongdoers can easily procure.106  This is especially so in larger 
companies, where shareholders are frequently far removed from the day to day operations of the 
company, and where it rarely pays individual shareholders to become well-informed about the 
merits of a proposed ratification.  The problem may be less intense for institutional investors, 
                                                          
103 See eg  V.Brudney, ‘Revisiting the Import of Shareholder Consent for Corporate Fiduciary Loyalty 
Obligations’ (2000) 25 J of Corp.L.209; J.Lowry, ‘Reconstructing shareholder actions: A response to the Law 
Commission’s Consultation Paper’ (1997) The Co Lawyer 247, pp249-250; J.E.Parkinson, op cit n76, ch.8 
(opposing members giving approval for fraudulent wrongs in public companies); P.Koh, op cit n92, pp.384-7; 
A.Reisberg, ‘Theoretical Reflections on Derivative Actions in English Law: The Representative Problem’ 
(2006) 3 ECFR 69, pp78-9. 
104 This difficulty arises because voting to approve, or reject, a ratification is a ‘collective action’, where the 
temptation is to free-ride on the efforts of one’s fellow shareholders.  See generally E.B.Rock, ‘The Logic and 
(Uncertain) Significance of Institutional Shareholder Activism’ (1991) 79 Georgetown L.J. 445. 
105  On the nature of bounded rationality for economic agents in general, see S.Hargreaves Heap, M.Hollis, 
B.Lyons, R.Sugden and A.Weale, The Theory of Choice: A Critical Guide (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992) ch.1.  On 
the problems of informational asymmetry for shareholders specifically, see B.R.Cheffins, Company Law: 
Theory, Structure and Operation (Oxford: OUP, 1997) ch.3.   
106 Parkinson, op cit n76, ch8. 
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given their comparatively larger holdings,107 but empirical evidence suggests even they have 
tended to remain largely passive, despite exhortations to the contrary.108  Macey109 also observes 
that activism is far more likely to occur in respect of a ‘systemic governance issue’ (where an 
investor’s benefits of intervention are likely to be felt across a large number of companies within 
the investor’s ‘portfolio’)110 rather than an issue which affects only a single company. Yet a 
decision to ratify is, quintessentially, a single-company decision.    
Nevertheless, such concerns once again fail to justify the distinction the common law 
draws between fraudulent and non-fraudulent wrongs.  First, insofar as shareholder ratification is 
an unreliable process for absolving directors, it is so as much in relation to non-fraudulent as to 
fraudulent wrongs.  Shareholders might come to regret a decision to ratify a costly instance of 
non-self-serving negligence much more than a decision to ratify a relatively trivial instance of 
misappropriation of corporate property.  Second, concerns that directors might manipulate the 
information available to shareholders can be addressed to some extent, and in respect of all 
ratifications, by imposing stringent conditions as to the information which must be disclosed to 
shareholders.  
Yet even if shareholders are given all relevant information, there is no guarantee they will 
make use of it.  And even independent and disinterested members might reach bad, irrational, 
decisions to ratify their directors.  But this problem could again arise as much in respect of a 
non-fraudulent as of a fraudulent wrong.   It is, therefore, hardly solved by disregarding every 
                                                          
107 See Koh, op cit n93, p386. 
108 See eg. M.Goergen, L.Renneboog and C.Zhang, ‘Do UK Institutional Investors Monitor Their Investee 
Firms?’ (2008) 8 J.of Corp.Law Studies 39; B.R.Cheffins, Corporate Ownership and Control (Oxford: OUP, 
2008) ch.11. 
109 See J.R.Macey, Corporate Governance: Promises Kept, Promises Broken (Princeton: Princeton U.Press, 
2008) ch.13. 
110 Examples of such multi-company issues would be the terms of a new corporate governance code, to be 
imposed on all listed companies, or the acceptable structure of executive remuneration packages.  
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ratification (many of which might be perfectly rational), but then only in respect of an (ill-
defined) sub-set of fraudulent wrongs.  Far better to give the courts a power to review the weight 
to be accorded to every decision to ratify,111 by making any ratification a factor to take into 
account, but not an absolute bar, when a court decides whether to permit a derivative claim to 
continue.112   
 
(c) Towards a voting based approach 
The defects in the common law are, then, inherent in the transaction based approach, and their 
cure, it is argued, should be achieved through its replacement with what has been termed a 
‘voting based’ approach.  This would abandon the distinction between fraud and non-fraudulent 
wrongs.  All breaches of duty would be ratifiable,113 and all prospective breaches of duty would 
be capable of being authorised, but ratification or authorisation would have to be effected by a 
sufficiently rigorous process.  Since the voting based approach avoids the distinction between 
fraud and non-fraud, prevents self-interested voting, and permits all wrongs to be ratified, it 
promises to avoid the defects in the transaction based approach described above.  The strength of 
the case for that approach, then, largely depends upon how compelling the reader finds the 
aforesaid criticisms.  However, concerns have been raised against the practicality of a voting 
based approach, and these alleged flaws in the voting based approach do deserve consideration.  
 First, we should clarify what its ‘more rigorous’ voting process entails?  Payne suggests 
three possibilities: that courts be entitled to ignore any ratification not passed in the best interests 
                                                          
111 For a fuller argument to this effect, see S.M.Beck, ‘The Shareholders’ Derivative Action’ [1974] The 
Canadian Bar Review 159.   
112  For discussions of the operation of such a regime in Hong Kong, see J.L.Yap, ‘Reforming Ratification’ 
[2011] 40 Common Law World Rev.1.  
113 Or, at least, insofar as the duty protected the interests of shareholders.   
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of the company, that any ratification be required to be passed unanimously, or that courts be free 
to ignore the votes of some shareholders in deciding whether a ratification has been passed.114   
 The first possibility adopts the same judicial control that applies to alterations of a 
company’s articles of association.115  Yet such a judicial control has provided scant protection 
for minority shareholders challenging such alterations,116 and it is questionable whether it would 
prove any more effective in controlling inappropriate ratifications.  Most troublingly, the test 
applied by the court in reviewing alterations has typically been expressed in subjective terms; 
what matters is whether the shareholders thought the alteration was in the best interests of the 
shareholders, not whether the court felt it to be so.117  To be sure, this subjectivity might be 
qualified by permitting judicial intervention where ‘no reasonable shareholder’ could have felt 
the alteration to be beneficial to the company’s interests.118  Yet this hardly resolves the 
dilemma.  Any subjective test – however qualified it might be – must by definition give some 
presumptive weight to the views of the shareholders themselves.  Yet if that is to be done, one 
would surely want such weight to be accorded only to shareholders whose views can be trusted.   
  Whereas a requirement that ratifications be passed in the best interests of the company is 
too weak, requiring all ratifications to be passed unanimously is too restrictive.  It gives a power 
of veto to any individual shareholder who chooses to object to a ratification.  And whilst such 
                                                          
114 Payne, op cit n9, pp618-625. 
115 Allen v Gold Reefs of West Africa Ltd [1900] 1 Ch 656. 
116 See for example Greenhalgh v Arderne Cinemas Ltd [1950] 2 All ER 1120; Citco Banking Corporation NV v 
Pusser’s Ltd [2007] 2 BCLC 483 [PC].  
117 Admittedly, a more objective review was applied in cases in which articles were altered in order to facilitate 
the expropriation of a minority shareholder.  However, this approach may also have to be reviewed in light of 
the decision in Citco Banking Corporation NV v Pusser’s Ltd ibid, discussed in R.Williams, ‘Bona Fide in the 
Interests of Certainty’ [2007] 66 Camb.L.J.500.  See generally Davies and Worthington op cit n10, paras.19.11-
19.22.   
118 Such a formulation was adopted in Shuttleworth v Cox Bros & Co [1927] 2 KB 9. 
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objectors may honestly believe it is in the company’s best interests not to ratify, they may also be 
using that power of veto for purely personal ends, to extract benefits from the company.119   
That leaves voting processes that ignore the votes of some members.  Whose votes 
should be excluded?  Our earlier discussion suggests that it ought to be those whose personal 
interest in the vote might illegitimately conflict with the maximisation of the value of the 
company.  Such a rule echoes that proposed by Vinelottt J in Prudential, where he spoke of 
disregarding the votes of those having ‘an interest [in the ratification] which conflicts with that 
of the company’.120  However, the reference to an ‘illegitimate’ conflict in the rule proposed 
above captures our earlier idea that shareholders might sometimes have personal interests 
running counter to the goal of maximising corporate value, and (especially in quasi-partnerships) 
legitimately anticipate being free to vote to protect those interests even if they decrease the 
company’s value.  To take one example, different shareholders likely have different, but 
legitimate, investment horizons.  A short term investor might oppose a derivative claim that’s 
likely to be protracted, and whose costs will arise in the short term but whose benefits may 
accrue only after the shareholder anticipates leaving the company.  Such a member has a 
personal interest in the matter, but not one that would be likely regarded as illegitimate.    
A rule excluding the votes of those with illegitimate interests could be expressed just in 
those terms, leaving it to the judge in each particular case to decide what personal interests each 
shareholder had, and whether they are likely to conflict illegitimately with the maximisation of 
the company’s value.  But such a ‘muddy’ rule would hardly promote certainty and 
predictability.  Better to provide, in addition to the exclusion of those with illegitimate 
conflicting interests, that those who are not independent of the wrongdoers should automatically 
                                                          
119 On the risks associated with powers of veto, see H.A.Hansmann, ‘Corporation and Contract’ (2006) 8 
American Law and Econ.Rev.1; C.A.Riley, ‘The Not-so Dynamic Quality of Corporate Law: A UK Perspective 
on Hansmann’s “Corporation and Contract”’ (2010) King's Law Journal 469. 
120 Op cit n38, p.307. 
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be precluded from voting, thereby creating an irrebutable presumption that such members have 
an interest conflicting with that of the company.   
 Two criticisms of excluding members from voting might be advanced.  One concerns the 
infringement of a member’s property rights121 which such an exclusion entails, and has been 
rejected already.122  The other is the alleged impracticality of such a system.  First, it may be said 
that any test based on the ‘independence’ of a member will lack certainty, at least if not restricted 
to certain specified relationships.  Yet the uncertainty here is of a quite different order to that 
which we saw afflicts the definition of fraud in the transaction based approach.  The concept of 
fraud lacks precision because there is no sound policy underlying the distinction between 
fraudulent and non-fraudulent wrongs in the first place.  But the purpose in excluding those who 
are not independent of the wrongdoers is clear, and defensible, and that purpose can be used to 
produce a more tailored meaning of independence in individual cases.    
 Second, applying tests of independence and disinterest to the large number of 
shareholders in a public company will, it is claimed, make the process too cumbersome, slow and 
expensive.123  Yet the problem seems exaggerated.  In companies with large numbers of 
shareholders, the reality is that the overwhelming majority of members will be independent and 
disinterested.  Votes for ratification will likely be passed with sufficient majorities to mean that, 
even if some doubt might afterwards be raised as to whether a particular member ought to have 
been entitled to vote, any such irregularity will likely have made no difference to the outcome of 
the resolution.  Third, and finally, it might also be said that the benchmark of a ‘company’s 
interests’, against which any member’s right to vote is to be judged, lacks substance.  Companies 
                                                          
121 Sealy (op cit n75 at p.32) also criticises the exclusion of some members’ votes for being ‘undemocratic’.  But 
the nature and extent of the democracy that is to operate within a company ought to be the outcome of the same 
contractarian process of hypothetical bargaining discussed above.  A ‘democracy’ objection, then, arguably 
fares no better than a ‘property rights’ objection.   
122 See supra text following n76.   
123 J.E.Parkinson, op cit n76, p256. 
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are, after all, legal fictions, with no interests of their own.  However, for the reasons developed in 
Part III, the company’s interests with regard to any ratification are clear, being definable in terms 
of the maximisation of its value.  And, it is worth noting in passing, this is essentially the test that 
is now being employed by the courts, when deciding whether to give a claimant permission to 
continue a derivative claim, and asking what view a ‘hypothetical director’ would take of the 
claim’s continuation. 124  
 
IV  RATIFICATION UNDER THE COMPANIES ACT 2006 
To what extent did the Companies Act 2006 successfully address the defects in the common law 
described above?  The Law Commission, whose work formed one of the foundation stones of the 
reform process that led to the Act, had already noted the importance of ratification to the scope 
of the derivative action, adding, with stereotypically English understatement, ‘it is not always 
clear when ratification will be effective’.125  The Commission argued, however, that ratification 
was outside its terms of reference, and therefore declined to offer its own recommendations for 
reform.  It did, nevertheless, come to recommend that an actual, and ‘effective’, ratification 
should continue to be an absolute bar to a derivative claim.126  What would amount to effective 
ratification would be determined in accordance with the existing law, a position which the 
Commission itself conceded raised the ‘danger that our desire to simplify the derivative action 
could be undermined by the complexities which arise where it is claimed that the relevant breach 
of duty has been (or may be) ratified.’127   
                                                          
124 See supra n81. 
125 Law Commission, Shareholders’ Remedies: A Consultation Paper (Law Comm. Consultation Paper 142, 
1996) para.5.2, footnote omitted. 
126 The Commission recommended that ratifiability, without actual ratification, should be a matter the court 
could merely take into account: Law Commission op cit n2, para 6.84.  
127 Ibid, para 6.81. 
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 If the Law Commission was able to sidestep these thorny issues by pleading its limited 
terms of reference, the Company Law Reform Steering Group ('CLRSG'), the body charged with 
the oversight of the Modern Company Law Review128 which was to lead to the Act, had no such 
excuse.  And the CLRSG seemed commendably willing to consider reform to the principles 
governing ratification, at least as they would be relevant within the context of the derivative 
claim.  In its consultation document, Developing the Framework,129 it accepted that 
‘modernisation and simplification’ of the law on ratification might be appropriate and that, 
moreover, the ‘principles which should apply are clear’.   
 These principles suggested a strong preference for the ‘voting-based approach’.  Whether 
a derivative claim should be allowed to proceed, it was argued, depended upon whether any 
decision not to sue ‘has been taken by, or was dependent on, the votes of the wrongdoers or those 
under the influence of the wrongdoers’.130  Were a decision tainted in this way, then ‘it should 
clearly not be valid to preclude a derivative action’.131  Ratification (or a decision not to sue) 
taken independently of the wrongdoers was envisaged as sufficient to preclude a derivative 
action, and that conclusion ‘did not inherently depend on the character of the conduct 
complained of’.132  These views survived largely intact in the CLRSG’s next consultation 
document, Completing the Structure.133  Decisions to ratify should ‘depend on whether the 
necessary majority had been reached without the need to rely upon the votes of the wrongdoers, 
                                                          
128 This Review, launched in 1998 by the then newly elected Labour Government, led eventually to the 
enactment of the Companies Act 2006.  The various consultation documentations associated with the Review are 
archived at http://bis.ecgroup.net/Publications/BusinessLaw/CompaniesAct2006.aspx 
129 CLRSG, Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: Developing the Framework (London: DTI, 
March 2000). 
130 Ibid., para.4.135 
131 Ibid., para.4.136 
132 Ibid., para.4.135 
133 CLRSG, Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: Completing the Structure (London: DTI, 
November 2000). 
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or of those who were substantially under their influence, or who had a personal interest in the 
condoning of the wrong’.134  Crucially, this was to apply ‘whether or not [the wrong was] a 
fraud’,135 whilst the CLRSG noted that ‘no responses [to its consultation] favoured retention of 
the old-fashioned “fraud on the minority” test as the basis for founding derivative actions’.136   
The CLRSG’s Final Report reiterated this preferred approach without further amendment.137   
The Act followed the CLRSG’s recommendation by replacing138 the common law 
derivative action with a new ‘statutory derivative claim’.139  Yet whilst attempting to divorce the 
new law from the old, the Act made only a limited change to the process by which ratification is 
to be achieved, and no change at all to the definition or consequences of fraud.  The failings of 
the Act are best assessed by considering its impact on the criticisms of the common law set out in 
Part III above. 
 
(i) The treatment of non-fraudulent wrongdoing 
 The Act did at least go some way towards addressing the law’s lax treatment of non-
fraudulent breaches of duty.  First, recall that no common law derivative action could be brought 
in respect of a non-fraudulent breach, whether or not such a breach had actually been ratified: 
mere ratifiability sufficed to preclude such proceedings.  Now, however, it seems beyond doubt 
that derivative proceedings can be brought for any breach of duty, whether or not it would 
                                                          
134 Ibid. para 5.85. 
135 Ibid. 
136 Ibid. para 5.86.   
137 CLRSG, Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: Final Report, Vol.I (London: DTI, November 
2000), para 7.46. 
138 By section 260(2) Companies Act 2006, derivative proceedings may now only be brought under Part 11 (or 
pursuant to an order of the court in ‘unfair prejudice’ proceedings (under section 994 Companies Act 2006).   
139 The proceedings in England, Wales and Northern Ireland bear this name.  In Scotland, they are called 
‘derivative proceedings’.   
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constitute ‘fraud’.  So, section 260(3) identifies the wrongs for which a claim may be brought,140 
with no mention that such wrongs must also amount to fraud.  Moreover, whilst an effective 
actual ratification141 remains a bar142 to the court granting permission for the continuation of a 
derivative claim under the Act,143 that very requirement of an actual ratification shows that mere 
ratifiability alone no longer precludes a derivative claim.144      
 Further, the right of wrongdoers to excuse their own wrongdoing has also been curtailed.  
Section 239(3)-(4) requires any ratification to be an ‘unconnected’ one, that is passed without the 
votes of the wrongdoer or any person connected with him.145  However, the scope of this reform 
is limited, and in several ways.  First, the requirement of an unconnected vote applies only to 
ratifications; there is no such requirement in respect of prior authorisations.146  Second, the Act 
excludes the votes only of those who are connected with the wrongdoer.  By contrast, the 
                                                          
140 Namely ‘an actual or proposed act or omission involving negligence, default, breach of duty or breach of 
trust by a director of the company’.   
141 Permission must also be refused where the wrong has been authorised by the members in advance; see 
s263(2)(c)(i). In the absence of actual ratification, the likelihood the wrong would be ratified after it has 
occurred, or authorised before it occurs, is a factor the court must take into account in deciding whether to give 
permission for the claim to continue 
142 s 263(2)(c)(ii). 
143  Under s 261, a claimant must obtain the court’s permission to continue a derivative claim.  (In Scotland, the 
court’s leave must be obtained to raise derivative proceedings: Companies Act 2006, s 266.)  On the permission 
requirement, and the factors that must be applied by the court in determining whether to grant permission, see A 
Keay and J Loughrey, ‘Something old . . etc’ op cit n5, pp.479-497.   
144 In Parry v Bartlett [2011] EWHC 3146 (Ch) Counsel for the defendant director argued that mere ratifiability 
was sufficient to require permission to continue the claim to be refused.  Although clearly erroneous, the judge 
dealt with this only by finding that the wrong in question was not ratifiable.   
145 s 239 also makes clear that ratification must be effected by the members, resolving a longstanding 
controversy over whether directors (who will usually have been delegated the task of managing the company 
and will accordingly have the authority to decide, positively, that the company shall sue) should also have the 
power to ratify a wrong; see L.S.Sealy, ‘The Director as Trustee’ [1967] Camb.L.J. 83, pp.102-3; Payne, op cit 
n9, p608 and P.Koh, op cit n93, pp.382-4. 
146 This is generally assumed to be so (see for example D.Kershaw, op cit n88, p.613) although the Act is silent 
as to the process for granting authorisation. 
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Company Law Reform Bill,147 as originally drafted, required any ratification to be disinterested, 
that is effected 'without the votes of members with a personal interest, direct or indirect, in the 
ratification’.  There was concern, however, that this terminology of ‘a personal interest, direct or 
indirect, in the ratification’, lacked certainty.  ‘Connected persons’, by contrast, are defined in 
exhaustive (and exhausting) detail within the Act itself.148   
Yet whilst the category of ‘connected persons’ may be more certain, it also gives the 
court substantially less flexibility in determining whether it is inappropriate for a particular 
shareholder to join in the vote, given the specific details of her relationship to a wrongdoer, or 
her interest in the transaction in question.  Worse still, the concept of a ‘connected person’ within 
the Act was simply not designed for the purpose of excluding some members from voting on 
matters in which they have an illegitimate personal interest.  It was, rather, designed to extend 
the definition of a director, in situations where liability was being imposed on directors for 
benefits they might have improperly secured.  It catches those who, in virtue of being benefited, 
benefit a director.  It does not catch all those who, for example, may be so influenced by, or so 
dependent upon, a director, that they cannot be trusted to vote in the best interests of the 
company.  To take but one example, the definition of connected persons does not include those 
who have a close business relationship (other than being members of a partnership) with a 
director.  These limitations in the definition of connected persons were thrown into sharp relief in 
Franbar Holdings Ltd v Patel,149 which we consider below.  Perhaps these problems with the 
law’s exclusion of the votes of only ‘connected persons’ would be a price worth paying, in order 
                                                          
147 See clause 216(4). 
148 See ss 252-6.   
149 [2008] BCC 885. 
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to avoid the uncertain terminology of ‘disinterested members’.  Yet such an argument sits 
uneasily with the Act’s retention of that very concept in section 263(4).150   
 Finally, whilst the Act commendably no longer treats mere ratifiability as sufficient to 
preclude a derivative claim, still actual ratification is, as we have seen, a mandatory bar to the 
court granting permission to continue a claim.151  The court therefore enjoys no discretion to 
judge the rationality of an actual ratification, or to measure it against its own assessment of the 
merits of continuing a claim, and thus to respond to the concerns noted above about the ability of 
even independent and disinterested shareholders to decide whether a director should be released 
from a breach of duty.   
 
(ii) The treatment of fraud and the law’s lack of clarity 
It will be convenient to take these two defects in the common law together, for the latter is so 
largely a product of the former.  How does the Act now deal with fraudulent wrongs?  Is this 
concept even preserved within the new statutory scheme, and if it is, do such wrongs remain, as 
the orthodox account of the common law maintained, wholly unratifiable?  We have already 
noted that the Act no longer requires the wrong in respect of which a derivative claim is being 
brought to constitute ‘fraud’.  Nor, in fact, does it expressly refer to fraud in setting out the 
possibility of ratification.  Instead section 239 merely provides, in subsection (7), that ‘[t]his 
section does not affect . . . any rule of law as to acts that are incapable of being ratified by the 
                                                          
150 Companies Act 2006, s 263(4) requires the court, when deciding whether to give permission to a claimant to 
continue a derivative claim, to have ‘particular regard . . .  to the views of members of the company who have 
no personal interest, direct or indirect, in the matter’.  For judicial interpretation of that wording, see Iesini v 
Westrip Holdings Holdings Ltd op cit n80, pp450-1, para.129. 
151 The Law Commission, in its Shareholders’ Remedies: A Consultation Paper (Law Comm. Consultation 
Paper 142) para16.35, favoured making ratification a merely discretionary factor.  However, by the time it 
published its Report, op cit n2, para6.84, its attitude had changed, and it recommended that ratification should 
be an absolute bar.   
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company’.  Thus, the Act falls back on the common law.152  Likewise, the Act simply preserves, 
untouched, the common law position as to which wrongs which are, or are not, capable of being 
authorised.153   
Yet in preserving the common law rules in this way, the Act inevitably also preserves all 
the uncertainties to which the common law was subject.  The Act does nothing to resolve the 
common law’s lack of clarity about the definition of fraud. Nor does it do anything to resolve the 
conflict between the orthodox and the heretical interpretations of shareholders’ ability to ratify 
fraudulent wrongs.For a reform process lasting nine years, and aiming to produce a more certain 
and comprehensible body of law, this is a sad indictment of its efforts.  It is also a badly missed 
opportunity to realise the benefits of a voting based approach to ratification.  By preserving the 
common law rules, the Act necessarily preserves the transaction based approach which was 
integral to that common law position.  Whilst fraud may no longer be a precondition to the 
bringing of a derivative claim, sparing litigants the vagaries of classifying the breach of duty 
which is the subject of the claim, that task inevitably arises in deciding whether, or how, the 
breach might be effectively ratified.   
Might it not still be possible, however, finally to conjure a voting based approach from 
the new statutory framework?  Could this not be achieved by takingthe requirement in section 
239 that all ratifications must now be ‘unconnected’, and combining this with a heretical 
interpretation of the ability to ratify even fraudulent wrongs?  The attempt might proceed as 
follows.  If the common law were to be interpreted (heretically) as permitting even fraud to be 
ratified, provided such ratification were sufficiently rigorous, then an unconnected ratification 
                                                          
152 For Parliamentary acknowledgement of the common-law-preserving nature of clause 216 of the Bill, which 
became s 239 of the Act, see Hansard, 9 Feb 2006 : Column GC368.     
153 See s 180(4), which provides that ‘[t]he general duties (a) have effect subject to any rule of law enabling the 
company to give authority, specifically or generally, for anything to be done (or omitted) by the directors, or any 
of them, that would otherwise be a breach of duty’.   
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could be accepted as satisfying that requirement of rigour  Fraud, like non-fraud, would then be 
capable of ratification, but both would require the same, unconnected, vote.  No longer would it 
matter whether a wrong was to be regarded as fraud or non-fraud, finally allowing the distinction 
to be buried as irrelevant.   
 Sadly, however, such a strategy is bound to fail.  First, even if it worked for ratifications, 
it could not work for authorisations.  As we have seen, the Act still permits wrongdoers to vote 
on an authorisation.  Even if we interpreted the common law, heretically, to permit all wrongs to 
be authorised, fraudulent wrongs would have to be authorised by some process more rigorous 
than the self-interested voting that the Act still permits for non-fraudulent wrongs.  Second, the 
strategy cannot work for ratifications either.  For a heretical interpretation of the common law 
could not, from both a doctrinal and a policy point of view, accept a merely unconnected 
ratification as sufficiently rigorous to excuse a breach of duty.  The policy argument should by 
now be clear: a defensible voting based approach must require a disinterested vote, yet the 
exclusion only of votes cast by those ‘connected’ with the wrongdoer is narrow, inflexible, and 
insufficiently controls the exercise of votes harmful to the company’s commercial interests.  
 As to the doctrinal point, those cases which lend support to the heretical interpretation of 
the common law surely envisage something more demanding than a merely ‘unconnected’ vote.  
Vinelott J in Prudential spoke of fraud being ratifiable provided the wrongdoers ‘did not control 
the company’ and the majority ‘does not have an interest which conflicts with that of the 
company’.  These are rather more open-ended, flexible and demanding conditions than the 
narrow and technical statutory rules excluding only ‘connected persons’ from voting.  Similar 
observations apply to the decision of Knox J in Smith v Croft (No 3).154  Although Knox J sought 
to identify the preconditions only for a binding decision not to sue, the preconditions for a 
                                                          
154 op cit n57.  
 38 
binding decision to ratify should surely be at least as demanding.155  And for a binding decision 
not to sue in respect of a fraudulent wrong, Knox J explicitly required a decision that was taken 
only by shareholders who were independent of the wrongdoers, a characteristic he discussed at 
some length.  Ultimately, he focused on whether a shareholder’s votes were likely to be 
exercised bona fide for the benefit of the company as a whole, a test derived from cases in which 
alterations of the articles were impugned.156  Although this focus on a shareholder’s likely motive 
is not the one the current writer would prefer, nevertheless it is clearly quite different from the 
concept of ‘connectedness’.157   
 
V: Franbar Holdings Ltd v Patel 
The impossibility of conjuring a voting based approach from the Act, and the inevitable 
survival of a transaction based approach with its many defects, is starkly demonstrated by the 
case of Franbar Holdings Ltd v Patel.158  The facts were relatively straightforward.  Franbar 
owned 25% of the shares of Medicentres (UK) Ltd.  The remaining shares were all owned by 
Casualty Plus Ltd ('CP'), which had appointed two directors to the board of Medicentres.  
Franbar had an option to sell its shares in Medicentres to CP, and CP likewise had an option to 
purchase Franbar’s shares.  The relationship between Franbar and CP broke down.  Franbar 
made a number of allegations against CP’s two appointed directors, including that they had 
caused business opportunities intended for Medicentres to be diverted to CP.  Franbar brought 
                                                          
155 Indeed, given its irrevocable nature, a decision to ratify should arguably require a more demanding process, 
especially in terms of the information held by shareholders, than should a decision not to sue.   
156 See eg Allen v Gold Reefs of West Africa Ltd [1900] 1 Ch. 656, Greenhalgh v Arderne Cinemas Ltd [1951] 
Ch 286. 
157 Kershaw seems to take a somewhat different view (op cit n88, p.654).  His argument is that, assuming that fraud 
is only unratifiable where ratification would involve ‘oppression’ of the minority, then the requirement of an 
unconnected vote under s 239 effectively precludes such oppression.  The difficulty that Franbar infra presents for 
this argument is not considered.   
158 [2008] BCC 885. 
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(amongst other proceedings)159 a derivative claim against CP's two appointed directors, and 
sought the court’s permission to continue that claim.   
Although there had been no actual ratification, the court, in deciding whether to grant 
permission, still had to consider the likelihood that the wrongs would be ratified in the future.160  
Counsel for the defendant directors argued ratification was likely, since CP would use its 75% 
shareholding to vote in favour.  Of course, if CP were connected with the defendant directors, 
CP’s votes could not be counted on the resolution.  However, although CP was hardly 
independent of the directors it had itself appointed, and was surely interested in any vote to ratify 
their alleged misconduct,161 the court found no evidence that ‘Casualty Plus is a person 
connected to either of them in the sense for which provision is made by s254.’162   
Unable to show that Casualty Plus would be precluded, by section 239(4), from voting 
for ratification, Franbar argued instead that the wrongs in question would not, in any case, be 
ratifiable at common law.  Deputy judge William Trower QC noted that section 239(7) expressly 
preserved any rule of law by which acts were incapable of ratification, which would include163 
acts amounting to a fraud on the minority.164  Nevertheless, he did not seem to view the common 
law as preventing fraud from being ratified under any circumstances.  Rather, he appeared to 
                                                          
159 Besides its derivative claim, Franbar also brought proceedings for breach of a shareholders’ agreement, and 
under Companies Act 2006, s 994 (for unfair prejudice).  
160 Under s 263(3)(d). 
161 One reason for this, according to the evidence of Franbar, was that one of the motives for the directors’ 
misbehaviour towards Medicentres was to drive down its value, and thus the price that would be payable by CP 
if it exercised its option to acquire Franbar’s shares. Forcing the directors to reimburse the company would 
increase its value and thus the price payable by CP. 
162 Op cit n158, para42, emphasis added. 
163  As noted above, acts might be incapable of ratification on other grounds; see supra at n18 and the text 
therewith.   
164 He accordingly rejected an argument by counsel for the defendants that the requirement of an unconnected 
ratification in s 239(4), had effectively replaced all earlier common law rules regarding which wrongs were 
incapable of being ratified.  
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view even fraud as ratifiable, but provided this did not constitute an exercise of wrongdoer 
control which would ‘have the effect that the claimant is being improperly prevented from 
bringing the claim on behalf of the company’.165  Thus, fraud was ratifiable, it seemed, so long as 
the vote to ratify didn’t involve the wrongdoers using their control of the company.  True, the 
point isn’t put quite as clearly or explicitly as one might wish.  The judge did, for example, say 
that ‘some of the complaints made by Franbar may well be incapable of ratification’.166  But the 
whole judgement is expressed in the context of ratification being effected by the wrongdoers in 
control, and the foregoing passage is surely to be interpreted as meaning ‘incapable of 
ratification by Casualty Plus’, an interpretation supported by the next sentence of the judgement, 
where his Lordship argues that some of the directors’ alleged misbehaviour might well amount to 
‘a breach of duty incapable of ratification on the votes of Casualty Plus’.167   
What would ensure a vote did not amount to an exercise of wrongdoer control was not 
identified in detail.  However, and crucially for the analysis offered in this article, it clearly 
required something more than its being ‘unconnected’.  As his Lordship noted, a claimant might 
be being improperly prevented from suing even ‘where the new connected person provisions are 
not satisfied, but there is still actual wrongdoer control pursuant to which there has been a 
diversion of assets to persons associated with the wrongdoer, albeit not connected in the sense 
for which provision is made by s.239(4)’.168  A distinction, then, was to be drawn amongst the 
various breaches of duty alleged against the directors.  Those breaches that did not amount to 
fraud would be ratifiable by a merely unconnected vote (and, since CP was not connected, 
ratification in respect of those was likely).  Those breaches which were to be categorised as fraud 
                                                          
165  Franbar op cit n158, para 45.   
166 Ibid, para 47.   
167 Ibid, emphasis added.   
168 Ibid, para 45.   
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could only be ratified without the votes of CP (since if CP were to vote, this would amount to an 
impermissible exercise of wrongdoer control).   
Thus, the court’s apparent (heretical) readiness to permit the ratification even of fraud, 
and even when combined with the Act’s requirement of unconnected ratifications, was still 
insufficient to disturb the common law’s transaction based approach.  Breaches of duty were still 
to be categorised as fraudulent or non-fraudulent, with the process for their ratification varying 
according to the category into which the breach of duty fell.   
If the case illustrates the inevitable retention of a transaction based approach under the 
Act, so too does it remind us of the uncertainties of that approach.  First, although one might 
welcome Deputy Judge Trower’s acceptance that fraud could be ratified, if done in the right way, 
the case was only a first instance decision, and ratification only one (and surely not the 
weightiest) factor in the judge’s decision whether to give permission for the derivative claim to 
continue.  It will take more than that to resolve the longstanding and deep-seated conflict 
between orthodox and heretical interpretations of the common law.169  Second, it remains unclear 
just what would count as an effective ratification in respect of fraud.  We do know that a merely 
unconnected vote would not suffice, but beyond that uncertainty prevails.   Whose votes are not 
allowed to count?  Is the test one of relationship with the wrongdoer?  Or is it an interest in the 
vote that debars and, if so, what sort of interest is fatal?  As our discussion of the voting based 
approach suggested, there are many alternatives here in teasing out the detail of a truly rigorous 
approach, yet apart from rejecting one possibility (only excluding unconnected votes) Franbar 
avoids this issue.   
                                                          
169 Ratifiability was also briefly discussed in Parry v Bartlett, op cit n144, paras.78-82.  It was held that the 
misconduct was unratifiable , and this conclusion was arrived following a (very brief) discussion of the common 
law doctrine on fraud on the minority.  However, since the company was owned 50/50 between the claimant and 
the defendant director, and since the latter would clearly be unable to vote on any ratification, the conclusion 
that the misconduct was ‘unratifiable’ may have meant no more than that the misconduct was unlikely to be 
ratified.  
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Third, the case highlights, yet does nothing to resolve, fraud’s uncertain scope.  The 
defendants’ fraud lay, apparently, in their attempted ‘diversion of assets to persons associated 
with the wrongdoer’.  Yet, as we have seen already, the concept of ‘corporate property’ is 
fraught with difficulty, especially where those ‘assets’ are mere corporate opportunities.  
Moreover, some of the alleged breaches of duty suggested only negligence on the part of the 
defendant directors, albeit such negligence would depress the value of Franbar’s shares in 
Medicentres.  This might not benefit the wrongdoers themselves, but it would benefit CP should 
it choose to exercise an option it held to purchase Franbar’s shares.  Whether such benefit to a 
third party would be sufficient echoes the uncertainty inherent in a test based on wrongdoer 
benefit which Vinelott J himself acknowledged in Prudential.170 
Finally it might be wondered whether, in referring to the exercise specifically of 
‘wrongdoer control’ as being fatal to the ratification of fraud, the judge was re-introducing a 
concept that was abandoned by the Companies Act 2006.  Recall that at common law, a 
shareholder could bring a derivative claim only if she was able to establish that the wrongdoers 
were in control of the company, and preventing it from suing.171  The 2006 Act, however, says 
nothing about the claimant shareholder having to establish such control as a precondition to 
bringing a claim.   
                                                          
170 See supra n40.   
171 See supra n19. 
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Although there has indeed been judicial suggestion that wrongdoer control is no longer 
part of the law governing derivative claims,172 there has also been judicial173 and academic174 
comment to the contrary.  There is not space here to explore this debate in detail.  However, 
since a voting based approach requires that ratification be effected independently of those with 
an illegitimate interest in the matter, then this necessarily requires that account be taken of the 
influence enjoyed by wrongdoers over the voting process.  And accordingly the ‘rubric’ of 
wrongdoer control might continued to be used to capture the sense of whether a vote to ratify 
was effected independently of the wrongdoers (without necessarily thereby invoking all the past 
case law that sought to define that concept as it was employed in the common law derivative 
action).     
 
VI: CONCLUSIONS 
It is rarely the case that a job half-done is well-done, and so it has proved in respect of the 
Companies Act 2006.  The Government deserved praise for confronting the unsatisfactory 
state of derivative proceedings, and made some changes of real benefit.  Allowing derivative 
claims in respect of all breaches of duty, without regard to whether they constitute fraud, is 
welcome, and requiring unconnected ratifications was at least a modest step in the right 
                                                          
172 See the comments of Lord Reid in the decision of the Inner House in Wishart v Castlecroft Securities Ltd 
[2010] BCC 161, 196-7 [para38], that the requirement of wrongdoer control, which had ‘given rise to difficulty 
in a number of cases’, is not repeated in the Act.   
173 See for example the comments of Judge Pelling QC in Stimpson v Southern Private Landlords Association 
[2009] EWCH 2072 [46] that the absence of wrongdoer control was a factor to take into account in deciding 
whether to grant permission to continue a derivative claim.  Note also the cases of Cinematic Finance Ltd v 
Ryder [2012] BCC 797 and Bamford v Harvey [2012] EWHC 2858 (Ch) in which the courts refused permission 
to continue derivative claims where the claimant shareholder had sufficient control within the company to 
ensure that the company itself could sue, obviating the need for derivative proceedings.      
174 See the excellent analysis offered by D.Kershaw, ‘The Rule in Foss v Harbottle is dead; Long Live the Rule 
in Foss v Harbottle’ (2013) LSE Law, Society and Economy Working Papers 5/2013, available at: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2209061## 
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direction.  But a modest step is ill-advised when the law’s defects demand a courageous leap, 
and much of the Act’s commendable effort has been undermined by its retention of the 
indefensible common law rules governing ratification (and authorisation).   
 As Franbar shows painfully clearly, whilst it may be possible, in applying the 
common law, to move beyond the orthodoxy’s treatment of fraudulent wrongs as wholly 
unratifiable, that must be done within the confines of the transaction based approach.  Even if 
all wrongs are to be regarded as ratifiable, the precise process of ratification (and a fortiori of 
authorisation) must still vary according to whether the wrong in question is, or is not, 
properly categorised as fraud.  It is surely paradoxical that an apparently minor amendment to 
the Company Law Reform Bill,175 motivated by a desire to achieve greater certainty and 
predictability, has the entirely unexpected, and far from minor, consequence of entrenching 
the distinction between fraud and non-fraud, with all the uncertainties and lack of 
predictability it creates.  Things could, and should, have been so different, and the Act will be 
judged as a badly missed opportunity to adopt the clear benefits of a voting based system to 
ratification.    
 
                                                          
175 Specifically clause 216; see supra, text with n146. 
